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The variance of returns to investment trust shareholders may be split into three components - variance
of net asset value (NAV) returns, variance of discount returns and twice the covariance between NAV
returns and discount returns.  Using historical data, the relative importance of each of these
components is estimated for different return intervals, different periods of observation and different
sub-sectors.  There is clear evidence of excess volatility of trust share returns compared with NAV
returns.  Since Big Bang in 1986, there has been a significant ‘double whammy’ effect, meaning that
discounts tend to widen when NAVs fall and narrow when NAVs rise.  Overall, the results are
consistent with the noise trader model.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Investment trusts are UK public companies whose assets consist of a portfolio of
securities.  They enable investors to purchase an interest in a professionally managed
fund and generally invest almost entirely in equities, often with a heavy overseas
involvement.  Ultimate responsibility for running the affairs of an investment trust lies
with the board of directors, but day-to-day administration and investment management
is normally delegated to an investment management firm.  In common with any other
company, an investment trust has a fixed (or ‘closed’) capital structure which must
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contain share capital but which may also include loan capital.1  To liquidate their
holdings, investors must normally sell their securities to other investors.2
The net asset value (NAV) of the ordinary shares (common stock) of a conventional
investment trust is obtained by deducting prior capital3 from the value of underlying
assets, and is normally expressed on a per share basis.4  NAVs are published monthly
with many investment trusts nowadays publishing the figures weekly or daily.
Published NAVs are generally considered to be reasonably accurate5 but if a significant
proportion of investments held are unquoted, there will be some uncertainty as to the
true value of underlying assets.
Investment trusts are characterised by one of the most interesting puzzles in financial
markets - the discount to NAV.6  There are a number of parts to this puzzle.  Trust
shares are issued at an average premium to NAV of about 2% (Levis & Thomas,
1995).  This premium largely reflects underwriting fees and start-up costs which must
be subtracted from initial proceeds.  Subsequently, often within a matter of months,
shares generally trade at a discount.  Discounts then fluctuate widely over time and
some trusts can on occasions trade at a premium to NAV.  At the end of the life of a
                                                       
1 ‘Split capital’ investment trusts, which have innovative capital structures, are excluded from the
discussion in this paper.
2 However, a number of trusts have a limited life.  There may be a fixed redemption date but very
often there are a number of optional winding up dates.  Furthermore, ‘buy backs’ have become
popular recently.
3 Prior capital is normally deducted at nominal value.  This is consistent with current accounting
requirements (FRS13) and is employed by The Association of Investment Trust Companies and by
Datastream.
4 If there are convertibles or warrants outstanding, it is standard practice in the investment trust
industry to make adjustments on a per share basis to give a ‘fully diluted’ figure i.e. convertibles are
assumed to be converted and warrants are treated as exercised if dilution of NAV would occur.
5 The month end NAVs are generally not known until up to ten days after the month end but
Datastream and Reuters estimate NAVs for most investment trusts on a daily basis.
6 Discount to NAV is defined as NAV less share price, expressed as a percentage of NAV.
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trust, due to ‘open-ending’ or liquidation, the discount narrows as the share price rises
to meet NAV less any liquidation costs.
Discounts are important in the context of investment trust risk analysis.  As part of the
return from a conventional investment trust share is due to changes in the discount,
discount variation over time contributes to the variance of returns from investment
trust shares.  Furthermore, discount changes over a period may be related to returns
from the underlying net assets of the trust over the same period.  If there is positive
correlation between discount returns and NAV returns, this will increase the variance
of share returns.  These are interesting aspects of the discount puzzle that have
received little attention in the literature.
Investment trusts are the UK equivalent of US closed-end funds that have attracted
considerable research interest.  Much of this research has concentrated on explaining
the discount puzzle (Dimson & Minio-Kozerski, 2000).  Explanations consistent with
market efficiency that have been proposed include miscalculation of NAV, agency
costs, tax timing and investment opportunities but, even taken together, they seem
incapable of explaining all parts of the puzzle.  In particular, they do not explain why
there are wide variations in discounts over time.7
If movements in investment trust discounts over time reflect investor sentiment and do
not conform to the efficient market model, there may be opportunities for investors to
                                                       
7 The most likely candidate is the agency cost argument in that the capitalised value of management
fees will vary as the discount rate varies.  However, changes in this discount rate will tend to coincide
with changes in the discount rate for the underlying assets, using a discounted dividend approach to
valuing the underlying assets.  In any case, there is little empirical evidence to support the notion that
discounts are a consequence of capitalising future management fees.
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generate excess returns by exploiting errors in the pricing of trusts.  Various US
studies have suggested that it is indeed possible to generate excess returns
systematically through decision rules based on discounts (e.g. Thompson, 1978;
Richards et al, 1980; Pontiff, 1995) but evidence for the UK is less convincing (Draper
& Paudyal, 1991).  Proper analysis of the components of the variance of share returns
for UK investment trusts may allow more sophisticated decision rules to be devised.
In this paper, we adopt a statistical approach based on historical data to analyse the
components of total risk of conventional investment trusts.  Excess volatility of the
trust share returns compared to NAV returns would indicate investor irrationality since
a trust share is a claim on the trust’s underlying NAV.  The results are compared and
contrasted with those of the Pontiff (1997) variance decomposition analysis for US
closed-end funds.
2.  COMPARISON WITH US CLOSED-END FUNDS
Although UK investment trusts are similar to US closed-end funds, there are important
differences relating to taxation, ownership structure and gearing.
The taxation of UK investment trusts is based on the principle of avoiding double
taxation of shareholders, as with US closed-end funds, but there are nevertheless
significant differences as regards the tax treatment of capital gains.  The underlying
fund of a UK investment trust is exempt from tax on capital gains but investors incur
tax on realised capital gains in the same way as for the securities of any other type of
company.  UK investment trusts are required to retain all realised capital gains unlike
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US closed-end funds which must distribute net realised capital gains8 in a given year to
shareholders as a capital gains distribution9.  US closed-end fund shareholders in turn
are liable for their proportion of capital gains tax, regardless of the length of time the
shares have been held, so new shareholders inherit a contingent capital gains tax
liability.
A major part of the US closed-end fund industry consists of bond funds that do not
exist in the UK.  This is due to the special UK tax regime that applies to authorised
unit trust bond funds, which is more favourable than the tax treatment of investment
trust bond funds.
There is a marked difference in the ownership structure of UK investment trusts and
US closed-end funds.  Typically, individuals hold a much lower percentage of the
equity of UK investment trusts compared with US closed-end funds.  Private
individuals held only 27% of UK investment trust shares in 1997 (HSBC James Capel,
1997).  In contrast, Lee et al (1991) report that US institutions owned only 6.6% of
US closed-end funds in 1988.
There are no legal restrictions on the level of debt or preference capital for UK
investment trusts and a few trusts are highly leveraged.  The level of debt in the capital
structure of US closed-end funds, however, is severely restricted by the Investment
                                                       
8 Unrealised capital gains are not taxed and need not be distributed until and unless realised.
9 Most closed-end funds elect to pay capital gains distributions to shareholders rather than retain
them.  The corporate capital gain tax rate normally exceeds the corresponding tax rate for individuals.
Although the retention of realised gains is rare, any corporate capital gain tax paid is passed on to
shareholders on a proportional basis as a tax credit.
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Company Act of 1940.  Funded debt and preferred stock must be covered at least
three times and twice by total assets respectively (Anderson & Born, 1992).
3.  NOISE TRADING
Recent attempts at explaining the discount puzzle for US closed-end funds have
involved investor irrationality.  The investor sentiment theory proposed by Lee et al
(1991), and developed from the De Long et al (1990) noise trader approach to finance,
has been especially prominent. Lee et al claim to have solved all parts of the closed-
end discount puzzle, but their theory has been the source of much controversy in the
last decade.  We first describe the noise trader model before discussing the Lee et al
investor sentiment theory of closed-end funds.
The noise trader model asserts that rational traders in financial markets interact with
noise traders. These noise traders are uninformed market participants who are active
traders and stock markets generate irrational valuations because of their activities.
When noise traders are present, large positive returns are immediately followed by
further large positive returns in the short term.  Their irrational trading activity imparts
so much risk to the markets that informed rational operators fear to trade against them.
This is because arbitrage by rational investors, who have finite time horizons, is risky
and therefore limited.  The model suggests that share prices will be more volatile than




Consistent with the De Long et al noise trader model is the notion that, in the absence
of any capital gains tax complications, closed-end fund discounts will tend to narrow
when the value of underlying assets rise.  A rise in stock markets will encourage noise
traders to look for ways into the market and closed-end funds, which provide a ready-
made portfolio of shares, will meet this demand.  On the other hand, a fall in the
market for the underlying assets will tend to cause a widening of the discount leading
to a ‘double whammy’ effect.
Lee et al (1991) argue that discount movements are driven by changes in the sentiment
of small investors who are the dominant owners of US closed-end funds.  Institutional
investors (who are the rational traders) fail to offset fully the irrational fluctuating
sentiment of small investors (who are the noise traders).  As discount movements are
cross-sectionally correlated (i.e. systematic), the noise trader risk is priced, so closed-
end funds will generally stand at a discount to NAV.  The theory requires that
discounts vary stochastically because it is precisely this discount volatility that is
responsible for the underpricing, in equilibrium, of closed-end funds relative to their
underlying net assets.
Lee et al provide evidence in support of their theory.  In particular, they report
contemporaneous correlation between closed-end fund discounts and share prices of
small firms (which tend to be held by small investors).10  However, Chen et al (1993),
using the same data as Lee et al, argue that the correctly measured comovement
between fund discounts and small firm returns is neither strong enough nor robust
                                                       
10 According to Lee et al (1991), in 1988, the average institutional ownership in the smallest 10% of
the firms on the NYSE was 26.5%, the average institutional ownership in the largest 10% of the firms
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enough to support the investor sentiment theory.  Other evidence on the Lee et al
theory is mixed.  Swaminathan (1996) shows that discounts forecast small firm returns,
which is consistent with investor sentiment theory but also that discounts contain
information about future economic activity (earnings growth rate and inflation) which
is not consistent with investor sentiment theory.  Elton et al (1998) find no evidence
that small investor sentiment, as measured by the change in discount of US closed-end
funds, is an important factor in the return generating process for US equities.  Ammer
(1992) makes the straightforward point that UK investment trusts are owned
predominantly by institutional investors, yet the stylized facts about UK investment
trust discounts are similar to those for US closed-end funds.  Indeed, UK discounts are
generally larger than US discounts.  He argues that the discount puzzle cannot
therefore be dismissed as an anomaly concerned with small investors.
Hoskins (1994) shows that US closed-end funds of the same type (stock, bond or
international funds) have discounts that move together.  It is not clear why this
discount comovement occurs, as it is not explained by the general sentiment of small
investors.   If investor sentiment is the explanation, there would have to be three types
of sentiment: one for stock funds, one for bond funds and one for international funds.
A number of studies on US country funds (e.g. Bodurtha et al, 1995) detect a common
component in the fluctuations of their discounts reflecting time-varying sentiments of
US investors in general rather than specifically individual investors.
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This section reviews work relating to the excess volatility of closed-end fund shares.
Most of the studies concern US closed-end funds, but we might expect similar results
for UK investment trusts apart from differences due to ownership structure, gearing or
taxation.
Share price return is equal to NAV return plus discount return11.  Using the standard
statistical formula for the variance of the sum of two random variables, it follows that
the variance of share return can be split into three components:
a) Variance of NAV return
b) Variance of discount return12
c) Twice the covariance between NAV returns and discount returns.
If the variance of closed-end fund share return is to equal the variance of the
corresponding NAV return, the covariance between NAV returns and discount returns
must be sufficiently negative to cancel out the variance of discount return.
Problems with variance decomposition studies include:
a) short-term volatilities in share prices are partly driven by technical factors
related to market imbalances (e.g. liquidity, bid-ask spreads).  Infrequent trading of




b) NAV is derived from the underlying portfolio, which contains shares whose
prices will have different degrees of staleness.  So the NAV time series acts like a
moving average of past ‘true’ prices and may be artificially smooth as a result.
Using longer return intervals can reduce the above problems, but this means that the
period of observation needs to be longer for there to be sufficient data points.
Unfortunately, this leads to time series estimation problems.  That is, the variances are
sample estimates of changing portfolios.  As the variances are affected by all the
observations in the time series, they will be imperfect estimates of the true variances.
This holds for both the variance of the closed-end fund share returns and the variance
of NAV returns.  Nevertheless, there is an implicit assumption that the estimation
problem will affect them identically.
US closed-end funds
There have been two variance decomposition studies for US closed-end funds, one by
Sharpe & Sosin (1974) using both annual and quarterly return intervals and one by
Pontiff (1997) using monthly return intervals.  In addition, there have been a variety of
studies, primarily concerned with other matters, which provide evidence concerning
the covariance between discount returns and NAV returns.
Sharpe & Sosin (1974), using annual data from 1933 to 1972 on ten US closed-end
funds invested largely in US equities, observe excess volatility of closed-end fund share
prices compared with underlying NAV for eight of the ten funds.  On average, the
                                                                                                                                                              
11 It is helpful to take logarithms as the returns are additive and their distributions are more
symmetric.  The time intervals for these returns could be any length - one week, one month or even a
11
11
standard deviation of return on the shares is approximately 17% greater than that of its
underlying net assets.  However, it is only a small sample of funds and an issue that is
particularly important for such a long-term study is that variances are sample estimates
of changing portfolios.  Using quarterly returns for eight of the funds over the period
1966 to 1973, Sharpe & Sosin find that the standard deviation of return on a share is
approximately 28% greater on average than that of its underlying net assets.  The
correlation coefficient between NAV returns and discount returns is negative for five
of the eight funds but is not significantly different from zero (5% level, two tail test)
for any of the funds.
Pontiff (1997), using monthly data from July 1965 to December 1985 on 52 US
closed-end funds, including both equity funds and bond funds, computes, for each fund
in the sample, the natural log of the ratio of the share return variance to the NAV
return variance. The average ratio is 0.494, which implies that the variance of the
average fund’s monthly return is 64% greater than the variance of its underlying NAV
return.  This means that the standard deviation of the average fund’s monthly return is
28% greater than that of its underlying NAV return.  This excess volatility is largely
idiosyncratic and unrelated to aggregate market risk.  Although Pontiff’s results are
biased to the extent that infrequent trading or bid-ask spreads bias the variance
estimates, when calculated for two monthly, three monthly and four monthly return
intervals, the average log variance ratios are still significantly different from zero.  And
since the magnitude of these biases is the same regardless of the return interval
whereas variance increases as the return interval increases, this suggests that the biases
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12 For monthly returns, the square root of b) is often known as ‘discount volatility’.
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are not severe.  Log variance ratios for intervals greater than four months are not
presented.  Pontiff observes negative covariance between discount returns and NAV
returns.  This negative covariance persists when bimonthly returns are used.
Other studies have looked, directly or indirectly, at the covariance between discount
returns and NAV returns, using return intervals ranging from weekly through to
annual.  They generally report negative covariance between discount returns and NAV
returns (Anderson & Born, 1987; Chen et al, 1993).  One exception is Brickley et al
(1991) which finds positive covariance using annual data over the period 1954 to
1985.  This suggests that the negative covariance relation observed by other authors
using return intervals ranging from weekly to quarterly may dissipate when longer
return intervals are considered.  Negative covariance between discount returns and
NAV returns is also observed for studies specifically looking at US country funds13
and based on weekly data (Hardouvelis et al, 1993; Bodurtha et al, 1995; Klibanoff et
al, 1998).
Malkiel (1977), using quarterly data over the period 1965 to 1972, shows that fund
discounts narrow when the US domestic equity market falls and increase when the
market rises.  This suggests a negative covariance between discount returns and NAV
returns, given that the funds in the sample are invested mainly in US domestic equities.
Malkiel argues that the negative covariance is due to an increase (or decrease) in the
contingent capital gains tax liability as the equity market rises (or falls).  UK
investment trusts do not suffer from this contingent capital gains tax effect that applies
                                                       
13 These are geographical specialists that invest solely in shares quoted on specific foreign stock
exchange(s) located in one particular country.
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to US closed-end funds and may therefore be regarded as more suitable vehicles for
testing the noise trader model and market efficiency.
UK investment trusts
A few research papers have touched on the question of excess volatility for UK
investment trusts, but the main emphasis of each of these papers has concerned other
matters.  They generally employ monthly return intervals.  There is currently no
published research that looks directly at the decomposition of the variance of
investment trust share returns.
Corner & Matatko (1982) examine the monthly returns on 92 investment trusts over
the period 1974 to 1979.  The average standard deviation of share price total returns is
8.6% whereas the average standard deviation of net asset value total returns is 5.8%.
However, this study covers a period in which discounts varied widely, both cross-
sectionally and over time.  The sector average discount climbed to around 40% in
1974 and again in 1976.  This period is now viewed in investment trust circles as quite
an unusual period.14
Both Draper & Paudyal (1991) and Cheng et al (1994) show that discounts tend to
narrow as the UK equity market15 rises and widen as it declines. As very few of the
largest trusts are invested entirely in the UK, this suggests the possible influence of UK
market sentiment on trust share prices and hence discounts.  It could also be
interpreted as overreaction in the pricing of trust shares.
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5.  VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION – MONTHLY RETURNS
In this section, we examine the components of total risk empirically for UK investment
trusts, using monthly return intervals.  We are implicitly assuming no structural
changes over the period of observation.  We use share prices unadjusted for ex-
dividend discontinuities16 together with fully diluted NAVs17, as is normal practice for
market participants, using data collected from Datastream.18  Dividends are then
ignored in calculating the three components of total risk.19
The sample consists of the 50 largest trusts as at 31 December 1981 (i.e. those with
market capitalisation greater than £10m at that time) which survived until the end of
1996.  Concentrating on larger trusts reduces the problem of infrequently traded shares
(and hence stale share prices) distorting variance and covariance estimates.  Trusts in
the sample are listed in the Appendix 1.
                                                                                                                                                              
14 Due to the capital gains tax rules applying to investment trust shareholders at the time, there was a
tax incentive for investors to sell investment trust shares before other shares at times of sharp market
falls (e.g. 1974) leading to very wide discounts.
15 as measured by the FT-Actuaries All Share Index.
16 There is a discontinuity in share prices when they go ex-dividend but revenue items are excluded in
the NAV calculation for UK investment trusts.  This is the case for NAVs published by both
Datastream and the AITC.  As a consequence there is a discount discontinuity at the ex-dividend date
for UK investment trusts and hence ceteris paribus a corresponding apparent negative discount
return.  This effect was investigated and makes no qualitative difference to the results of this paper.
17 The effect of using undiluted NAV together with the corresponding  ‘package’ of shares and
warrants, for those trusts with warrants outstanding at some point during the period of observation,
was investigated.  It made no qualitative difference to the results of this paper.
18 Data was also obtained from the AITC to provide a check for the major results in this chapter.
19 Dividends are included in the AITC return data.
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Appendix 2a shows the results using monthly data over the entire 15-year period of
observation.20  The variance of share return (total risk) is shown in Column (2).
Columns (3), (4) and (5) give the figures for the three components of total risk (all
measured in %2) for each trust in the sample, together with an average figure for the
whole sample.  Column (6) gives the correlation coefficient between NAV return and
discount return.
For the average trust, variance of NAV return represents only about 63% of the
variance of share return so there is clear evidence of ‘excess volatility’.  Variance of
discount return represents about 30% of the variance of share return, and the
covariance term is positive and accounts for the remaining 7%.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of correlation coefficients between NAV returns and
discount returns.  The correlation coefficient is positive for 39 of the 50 trusts.
                                                       
20 Very similar results were obtained using AITC data.
Figure 1 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with 






























Trusts for which the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
5% (1%) level are indicated by an asterisk (two asterisks) in Appendix 2a.  In all, 14
(11) of the 50 trusts have correlation coefficients which are positive and significantly
different from zero at the 5% (1%) level and only 3 (1) trusts have correlation
coefficients which are negative and significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%)
level.
The average correlation coefficient of 0.086 is positive and significantly different from
zero at the 1% level21, suggesting a ‘double whammy’ effect for the investment trust
sector.  That is, discounts widen when NAVs fall and discounts narrow when NAVs
rise.  It could be argued, however, that the homogeneous population assumption in the
significant test is invalid because the trusts in the sample are drawn from different sub-
sectors, within which there may be different mechanisms working.   We will therefore
repeat the above test for more homogeneous sub-sectors in Section 9.
6.  COMPARISON WITH PONTIFF’S RESULTS FOR US CLOSED-END
FUNDS
                                                       
21 If we assume a homogeneous underlying population ( ρ ρ ρ ρ1 2 3 50= = = =....... )  then
the average correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level (two tail test) if:










                                                =  0.027
We also assume that the zi are roughly normally distributed but the tests are robust to this assumption
and the results are sufficiently strong to remain unchallenged.
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Pontiff (1997) measures excess volatility by calculating the log variance ratio for each
fund in his sample.  This ratio is defined as the logarithm22 of the ratio of the variance
of share return to the variance of NAV return.  It will have a value of zero if variance
of share return is equal to the variance of NAV return.  The average of the log
variance ratios using figures in Appendix 1a is 0.444 which compares with an average
of 0.494 using monthly returns for the sample of US closed-end funds in Pontiff’s
study.  This suggests that there is similar excess volatility for UK investment trusts as
for US closed-end funds.
Table 1 shows the figures for the variance of share returns and the components of total
risk for the average trust together with corresponding figures from Pontiff’s variance
decomposition analysis.
Table 1: Comparison of results for average trust with those of Pontiff (1997)
Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar
UK investment
trusts (82-96)
38.97 24.72 11.50 2.74
US closed-end
funds (65-85)
51.15 37.89 37.33 -25.42
Note that variance of discount return is far greater on average for US closed-end funds
than for UK investment trusts.  This is consistent with the apparently greater success
of decision rules based on discounts for US closed-end funds.  But it should be
stressed that the period of observation for the Pontiff (1997) study is earlier than the
                                                       
22 The logarithm of the ratio is taken to reduce skewness.
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present study and includes the 1970s which were characterised by extreme movements
in closed-end fund discounts both in the US and in the UK.
Note also the large negative covariance term for the average US closed-end fund
compared with a small positive (but significant at the 1% level) covariance term for
UK investment trusts.  The negative covariance term for US closed-end funds may
partly reflect the contingent capital gains tax liability effect.
7.  LONGER RETURN INTERVALS
Appendices 2b and 2c show the results for the same analysis as in Section 5 but with
three-monthly return intervals and six-monthly return intervals respectively.  The
results for longer return intervals emphasise the importance of the investor’s time
horizon in the risk assessment of investment trusts.  There is still evidence of ‘excess
volatility’ but the effect reduces with longer return intervals.  For the average trust,
variance of NAV return represents 69% of variance of share return for three-monthly
intervals and 81% for six-monthly intervals.
Table 2 is a summary table for the average trust with monthly, three-monthly and six-
monthly return intervals.  The components are expressed as a percentage of the
variance of share returns.




Monthly 63% 30% 7%
Three-monthly 69% 17% 13%
Six-monthly 81% 12% 7%
If noise traders are affecting share prices in the market, the discount time series will
pick up the noise and discount movements will show the same negative autocorrelation
as the noise.  This will be reflected in mean reversion of the discount, and the relative
importance of the variance of discount returns as a component of total risk will be
lower with greater return intervals.  This effect is observed in Table 2.  For three-
monthly returns, variance of discount return contributes 17% of total risk for the
average trust compared with 30% for monthly intervals.  For six-monthly returns, the
contribution of the variance of discount return reduces even further to only 12% of
total risk for the average trust.
The contribution of the covariance term to total risk for the average trust is still
relatively small at 13% for three-monthly returns and 7% for six-monthly returns.  But
46 of the 50 trusts have positive covariance terms with three-monthly returns and 36 of
the 50 trusts have positive covariance terms with six-monthly returns.  Figures 2 and 3




Assuming a homogeneous population, the average correlation coefficient is again
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level (two tail test) for both
three-monthly and six-monthly returns.23  The ‘double whammy’ effect therefore
persists for longer return intervals.
                                                       
23 i.e. z > 0 048.  for three-monthly returns and z > 0 070.  for six-monthly returns.
Figure 2 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with 





























Figure 3 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with 





























8.  PERIOD OF OBSERVATION SPLIT INTO THREE FIVE-YEAR SUB-
PERIODS
We now split the period of observation into three five-year sub-periods - January 1982
to December 1986, January 1987 to December 1991, and January 1992 to December
1996, using monthly returns.24  Note that the end of the first five-year period is just
after ‘Big Bang’ of the London Stock Exchange (October 1986) and just before the
international stock market crash of October 1987.
Table 3 is a summary table for the average trust in each of the three sub-periods.
Table 3: Results for the three sub-periods for the average trust
Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr
1/82-12/86 29.45 16.65 14.46 -1.63 -0.045*
1/87-12/91 60.87 40.65 12.84 7.25 0.179**
1/92-12/96 26.51 16.51 7.49 2.47 0.125**
Table 3 shows that the variance of share returns (total risk) and the variance of NAV
returns are much higher in the second five-year period reflecting the turbulent equity
markets worldwide during and after the October 1987 crash.  Table 3 also suggests a
downward trend in discount volatility over time.  This may reflect some market
participants’ growing belief in the success of trading strategies based on selling low
                                                       
24 Very similar results were obtained using AITC data.
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discount trusts and buying high discount trusts.  Another possible reason for the
reduction in discount volatility could be the reduction in transaction costs.25
The contribution to total risk of the covariance term tends to be relatively small for
each of the three periods.  For the average trust in the first period the correlation
coefficient is negative (significant at 5% level, two tail test).  But note the change of
sign in the correlation coefficient for the average trust.  For the second and third
periods it is positive (in both cases significant at 1% level, two tail test).  One possible
reason for the apparent negative covariance term in the first 5-year period is that share
prices were slow to react to changes in underlying NAVs prior to Big Bang, not least
because information was not available.  There is strong evidence of a positive
correlation coefficient between discount returns and NAV returns since 1987,
suggesting that market participants in the investment trust sector overreact to the
fundamentals.  A positive covariance term is consistent with noise traders ‘jumping on
the bandwagon’ as regards NAV performance.
October 1987 was an exceptional month and arguably could be distorting the results.
In this month, for trusts in the sample, the unweighted average NAV return and
discount return were -31% and -4% respectively.  The analysis is therefore repeated
with the month of October 1987 excluded.  Figures for the average trust for the five-
year period from January 1987 to December 1991 are shown in Table 7.
                                                       
25The bid-ask spread has reduced considerably, particularly since Big Bang in October 1986.  Also,
transfer stamp duty for share purchases was 2% at the beginning of 1982 but was reduced to 1% in
March 1984 and reduced further to 0.5% in October 1986.
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Table 4: Results for average trust with month of October 1987 removed
Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar      Corr
1/87-12/91 38.90 23.87 11.89 3.09 0.125**
The differences caused by removing the month of October 1987 from the data set can
be observed by comparing the figures in Table 4 with the corresponding figures in
Table 3.  All the variance and covariance figures are lower, as expected.  The average
correlation coefficient between NAV returns and discount returns has been reduced
substantially although it is still significantly positive (at the 1% level, two tail test).
9.  SAMPLE SPLIT INTO SUB-SECTORS
Most investment trusts in the sample fall into one of three broad categories -
international, UK and geographical.  We therefore calculate the average correlation
coefficient for each of these sub-sectors.  There are 23 international trusts, 12 UK
trusts and 12 geographical trusts.  Of the remaining three trusts out of the sample of
50, one is a venture capital trust and two are European trusts.
Table 5: Average correlation coefficients for sub-sectors
Period International UK Geographical
(23 trusts) (12 trusts) (12 trusts)
1/82 - 12/86 -0.028 0.002 -0.068
1/87 - 12/91 0.236** 0.069 0.203**
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1/92 - 12/96 0.118** 0.130** 0.103**
1/82 - 12/96 0.111** 0.053* 0.090**
Table 5 gives the figures for the three five-year periods and for the whole 15 year
period.   Positive and significant correlation coefficients are observed for each of the
sub-sectors for both the later 5-year periods, with the exception of UK-invested trusts
in the period 1/87 - 12/91 for which the correlation coefficient is positive but not
significant.  For the early period 1/82 - 12/86, negative correlation coefficients are
observed for the international and geographical sub-sectors but they are not
statistically significant.  For the whole 15-year period, the average correlation
coefficient is positive for all sub-sectors.  It is significant at the 1% level for
geographical and international trusts but only at the 5% level for UK-invested trusts.
It is not clear why the ‘double whammy’ effect is stronger for trusts investing overseas.
10.  CONCLUSION
The results for the entire 15-year period of observation provide strong evidence of
excess volatility of share returns compared with NAV returns.  This is true for
monthly, three-monthly and six-monthly returns although the effect reduces as the
return interval increases.  This excess volatility contradicts the efficient market model
but is consistent with noise trader theory.
The results for monthly returns over the entire period of observation show the variance
of discount return to be less important than in the Pontiff (1997) study of US closed-
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end funds but still represents 30% of the variance of share returns for the average UK
trust.  There is, however, considerable cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of
this discount volatility and there seems to be persistence in the relative importance of
discount volatility for a given trust.
As the return interval is increased, discount volatility becomes less important because
discounts are mean reverting.  This implies that, in assessing risk, short-term investors
should be concerned with discount volatility as well as variance of NAV return
whereas most investors should be primarily concerned with variance of NAV return
rather than the often quoted volatility (of share return) based on monthly data.  The
reduction in the importance of discount volatility with longer return intervals is
consistent with the De Long et al noise trader model because some of the transient
noise will be removed with longer return intervals.
 There is clear evidence of a reduction in discount volatility over the 15-year period of
observation.  This may be due both to an increase in the number of discount anomaly
traders (following the success of decision rules in the past) and a reduction in
transaction costs.  It suggests that decision rules based purely on discount movements
may not generate excess returns in future.
The covariance term is small but has been significantly greater than zero for the
average trust since 1987, which means that discounts have tended to widen (or
narrow) when the underlying NAV falls (or rises).  This contrasts with the negative
covariance term reported by Pontiff (1997).  This ‘double whammy’ effect could be
due to noise traders overreacting to changes in the fundamentals (NAVs).  The
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contingent capital gains tax problem for US closed-end funds, which works in the
opposite direction, is not relevant to this UK study.
Evidence of the ‘double whammy’ effect is stronger for international and geographical
specialist trusts than for UK trusts.  Positive and significant correlation coefficients are
observed for each of the three major sub-sectors for both the later 5-year periods, with
the exception of UK-invested trusts in the period 1/87 - 12/91, for which the
correlation coefficient is positive but not significant.  If the existence of noise traders is
the underlying reason for the ‘double whammy’ effect, then why are they more in
evidence for trusts investing overseas?  This is an interesting area for further research.
A further question which is raised by the analysis is whether a decision rule based not
only on the level of the discount but also based on exploiting the positive covariance
between discount returns and NAV returns might be successful.  For example, trusts
on wide discounts would only be purchased when the NAV has risen x% and trusts on
narrow discounts would only be sold if the NAV has fallen x%.  This would mean less
dealing activity in carrying out a particular decision rule but should also result in higher
excess returns.  Such a decision rule could be tested over the years since the end of the
period of observation for this paper (31 December 1996).
To sum up, the results of the variance decomposition analysis are consistent with the
noise trader model.  There is strong evidence of excess volatility (trust share returns
are more volatile than NAV returns) and a ‘double whammy’ effect (discount returns
and NAV returns are positively correlated).  Discount volatility is an important
27
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Appendix 1: Sample for Components of Total Risk
Trust Mnemonic
Alliance Trust PLC atst
American Trust PLC amts
Anglo & Overseas Trust PLC aot
Bankers Investment Trust PLC bnkr
Baring Tribune Investment Trust PLC bti
British Assets Trust PLC bset
British Investment trust PLC bits
Brunner Investment Trust PLC but
Dunedin Income Growth Inv Tst PLC dig
Dunedin Smaller Co's Inv Tst PLC dndl
Dunedin Worldwide Inv Trust PLC dww
Edinburgh Investment Trust PLC edin
Electric&General Investment Co PLC elgn
English & Scottish Investors PLC ensc
Fleming American Inv Trust PLC fam
Fleming Claverhouse Inv Trust PLC fcv
Fleming Continental Euro Inv Tst fut
Fleming Far Eastern Inv Trust PLC ffe
Fleming Japanese Inv Trust PLC flmj
Fleming Mercantile Inv Trust PLC fmn
Fleming Overseas Inv Trust PLC fov
Foreign & Col Invest Trust PLC frcl
Foreign & Col. Pacific Inv Tst PLC fcp
Foreign & Colonial Smaller Co's PLC fcs
G.T.Japan Investment Trust PLC gtja
Govett Oriental Inv Trust PLC gor
Govett Strategic Inv Trust PLC gvs
Kleinwort Charter Inv Trust PLC klc
Kleinwort Overseas Inv Trust PLC kos
Merchants Trust PLC mrch
Mercury Keystone Investment Tst PLC mki
Monks Investment Trust PLC mnks
Murray Income Trust PLC mut
Murray International Trust PLC myi
Murray Smaller Markets Trust PLC msm
Murray Ventures PLC mvn
Overseas Investment Trust PLC oit
Scottish American Investment Co PLC scam
Scottish Eastern Inv Trust PLC scea
Scottish Investment Trust PLC scin
Scottish Mortgage & Trust PLC smt
Second Alliance Trust PLC sat
Securities Trust of Scotland PLC sts
St Andrew Trust PLC srw
Temple Bar Investment Trust PLC tmpl
Throgmorton Trust PLC thrg
TR City of London Trust PLC trcd
TR Property Investment Trust PLC try
TR Smaller Companies Inv Trust PLC tru
Witan Investment Co PLC wtan
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Appendix 2a: Results with monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr
ATST 27.61 17.99 6.51 3.09 0.143
AMTS 39.02 25.71 12.51 0.79 0.022
AOT 37.43 22.22 7.69 7.47 0.286**
BNKR 34.48 23.73 9.52 1.22 0.040
BTI 30.58 19.44 8.00 3.13 0.126
BSET 36.30 20.24 10.01 6.01 0.211**
BITS 22.49 20.38 8.15 -6.01 -0.233**
BUT 31.94 23.44 7.69 0.81 0.030
DIG 35.89 27.86 8.68 -0.65 -0.021
DNDL 29.48 21.70 7.81 -0.04 -0.001
DWW 30.35 23.26 7.90 -0.80 -0.030
EDIN 34.45 20.83 6.92 6.66 0.277**
ENSC 38.98 22.11 13.50 3.35 0.097
FAM 50.62 30.78 17.37 2.46 0.053
FCV 40.01 30.25 9.13 0.62 0.019
FUT 41.84 24.90 13.37 3.54 0.097
FFE 73.82 40.50 19.62 13.61 0.241**
FLMJ 66.15 39.07 23.63 3.44 0.057
FMN 27.63 16.88 8.12 2.61 0.112
FOV 42.82 22.51 11.17 9.09 0.286**
FCP 55.94 26.18 20.05 9.66 0.211**
FCS 37.72 24.71 12.47 0.53 0.015
FRCL 36.34 24.49 7.88 3.96 0.143
GOR 73.34 45.18 15.10 12.98 0.249**
GVS 49.97 38.43 11.73 -0.19 -0.004
GTJA 72.42 39.75 37.64 -4.95 -0.064
ELGN 41.04 27.03 9.52 4.46 0.139
KLC 31.70 18.62 9.61 3.45 0.129
KOS 35.46 21.67 9.45 4.32 0.151*
MRCH 36.89 23.60 8.38 4.88 0.173*
MKI 34.53 25.42 9.03 0.09 0.003
MNKS 31.34 23.98 6.49 0.87 0.035
MUT 30.07 21.10 10.24 -1.27 -0.043
MYI 31.30 19.94 10.25 1.11 0.039
MSM 48.22 33.31 13.12 1.78 0.043
MVN 26.73 15.21 17.41 -5.86 -0.180*
OIT 32.32 25.50 11.50 -4.65 -0.136
SCAM 28.45 13.69 9.13 5.60 0.251**
SCEA 37.37 24.05 7.53 5.75 0.214**
SCIN 30.17 19.88 7.10 3.18 0.134
SMT 35.87 25.93 6.39 3.52 0.137
SAT 25.45 18.44 5.39 1.60 0.080
STS 31.49 20.38 6.57 4.52 0.195**
SRW 23.38 19.76 7.80 -4.16 -0.167*
TMPL 33.36 20.94 8.27 4.12 0.156*
THRG 53.21 27.66 25.85 -0.30 -0.006
TRCD 36.49 24.16 8.59 3.72 0.129
TRY 54.94 24.00 25.25 5.67 0.115
TRU 46.32 23.81 13.50 8.96 0.250**
WTAN 34.76 25.37 6.34 3.03 0.120
Average 38.97 24.72 11.50 2.74 0.086**
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Appendix 2b: Results with three-monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr
ATST 80.54 57.38 10.60 12.35 0.250
AMTS 134.23 93.61 26.39 14.00 0.141
AOT 125.71 80.15 14.97 30.08 0.434**
BNKR 118.96 77.11 23.24 18.30 0.216
BTI 93.88 67.58 12.18 13.89 0.242
BSET 99.36 64.70 16.54 17.82 0.272*
BITS 79.65 64.44 15.39 -0.18 -0.003
BUT 102.37 77.98 13.52 10.69 0.165
DIG 102.30 86.21 12.56 3.46 0.053
DNDL 122.48 91.60 17.21 13.44 0.169
DWW 116.91 88.96 13.96 13.76 0.195
EDIN 99.48 73.66 10.84 14.73 0.261*
ENSC 108.66 77.79 19.78 10.91 0.139
FAM 177.40 97.29 39.56 39.87 0.321*
FCV 114.65 96.75 10.82 6.96 0.108
FUT 139.93 79.46 27.18 32.74 0.352**
FFE 283.22 162.88 47.72 71.41 0.405**
FLMJ 225.02 154.88 46.14 23.60 0.140
FMN 87.27 63.77 18.03 5.39 0.079
FOV 137.54 82.77 19.45 34.73 0.433**
FCP 182.49 99.82 38.66 43.28 0.348**
FCS 135.24 92.91 20.43 21.53 0.247
FRCL 120.49 85.70 16.32 18.17 0.243
GOR 279.21 180.92 37.34 59.93 0.365**
GVS 201.94 169.23 17.75 14.72 0.134
GTJA 220.74 146.38 68.05 6.20 0.031
ELGN 142.11 104.06 15.33 22.35 0.280*
KLC 90.31 62.46 19.55 8.16 0.117
KOS 131.50 80.69 20.78 29.52 0.360**
MRCH 101.65 73.58 15.33 12.53 0.187
MKI 100.15 83.23 17.02 -0.10 -0.001
MNKS 121.12 86.85 14.90 19.05 0.265*
MUT 88.22 67.67 14.57 5.88 0.094
MYI 96.93 68.21 19.85 8.72 0.118
MSM 209.20 140.13 24.23 44.09 0.378**
MVN 90.39 50.75 30.07 9.40 0.120
OIT 145.08 92.30 19.44 32.78 0.387**
SCAM 73.01 49.44 16.18 7.27 0.128
SCEA 98.12 80.81 10.40 6.80 0.117
SCIN 88.27 67.95 13.86 6.35 0.103
SMT 126.88 90.59 11.75 24.13 0.370**
SAT 80.68 59.37 11.21 9.94 0.193
STS 86.60 64.08 16.35 6.07 0.094
SRW 96.31 71.57 26.47 -1.71 -0.020
TMPL 94.29 62.74 14.68 16.59 0.273*
THRG 131.33 98.11 58.89 -25.25 -0.166
TRCD 104.74 71.21 17.10 16.15 0.231
TRY 189.22 115.03 58.67 15.27 0.093
TRU 129.60 88.28 22.76 18.26 0.204
WTAN 115.95 92.19 15.09 8.52 0.114
Average 128.43 88.70 22.38 17.05 0.196**
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Appendix 2c: Results with six-monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr
ATST 151.38 134.54 13.26 3.46 0.041
AMTS 243.06 220.66 30.34 -7.67 -0.047
AOT 205.69 163.01 16.39 25.40 0.246
BNKR 199.70 148.76 23.49 26.53 0.224
BTI 189.75 146.36 13.46 28.93 0.326
BSET 184.49 144.39 22.30 17.21 0.152
BITS 171.39 138.46 22.76 9.82 0.087
BUT 218.46 179.25 16.53 21.93 0.201
DIG 197.09 182.87 24.66 -10.09 -0.075
DNDL 221.25 192.19 26.27 2.70 0.019
DWW 245.67 196.33 15.05 33.14 0.305
EDIN 187.94 164.55 16.70 6.46 0.062
ENSC 220.33 173.88 22.97 22.70 0.180
FAM 335.24 234.10 60.50 39.28 0.165
FCV 183.09 168.79 18.00 -3.58 -0.032
FUT 274.03 175.75 38.21 58.07 0.354
FFE 472.09 356.00 40.18 73.37 0.307
FLMJ 477.68 384.64 66.31 25.85 0.081
FMN 144.40 141.75 17.13 -14.00 -0.142
FOV 278.37 191.08 25.26 59.96 0.432*
FCP 387.49 258.44 49.23 77.15 0.342
FCS 279.34 194.13 29.70 53.65 0.353
FRCL 254.13 198.41 25.96 28.77 0.200
GOR 502.83 408.89 35.08 56.90 0.238
GVS 307.53 321.95 17.49 -30.85 -0.206
GTJA 449.55 344.15 102.82 2.50 0.007
ELGN 308.54 227.06 20.75 58.71 0.428*
KLC 163.33 139.97 23.30 0.07 0.001
KOS 247.46 182.45 24.11 39.54 0.298
MRCH 185.14 150.55 24.96 9.31 0.076
MKI 193.34 157.50 23.76 11.68 0.095
MNKS 231.54 198.33 23.27 9.61 0.071
MUT 150.38 146.44 25.47 -20.82 -0.170
MYI 203.54 192.62 31.39 -19.79 -0.127
MSM 378.02 296.54 28.41 51.30 0.279
MVN 188.05 138.83 38.89 10.00 0.068
OIT 289.98 204.20 32.11 51.88 0.320
SCAM 124.31 113.80 19.78 -8.97 -0.095
SCEA 177.87 167.97 15.89 -5.79 -0.056
SCIN 179.52 149.78 11.74 17.40 0.207
SMT 238.80 189.96 10.51 37.04 0.414*
SAT 152.23 138.33 13.75 0.15 0.002
STS 166.73 153.22 14.43 -0.90 -0.010
SRW 149.98 153.37 27.03 -29.41 -0.228
TMPL 174.03 134.76 26.20 12.63 0.106
THRG 220.68 232.91 65.96 -75.59 -0.305
TRCD 130.93 134.63 17.34 -20.34 -0.210
TRY 428.87 281.52 71.47 73.35 0.259
TRU 184.11 169.08 28.24 -12.77 -0.092
WTAN 218.75 197.98 14.72 5.84 0.054
Average 241.36 196.30 28.47 16.03 0.104**
